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Abstract—VANET is the key to the Intelligent Trans-
portation Systems (ITS), where vehicles can communicate
with others to exchange information in real time. VANET
is an ad-hoc that has no fixed infrastructure and rapidly
changing network topology. As the result, the network
is insecure and vulnerable to various attacks both from
within and outside the network. This research analyzes
AODV routing protocol comparing the conditions without
the attacks and with the attacks with the of black hole
and jellyfish using the algorithm of Intrusion Detection
System with the number of nodes changing from 10
to 100 nodes at the change speeds of 70, 80, 90, 100,
110, and 120 km/h. This research is simulated using
Network Simulator 2 to model the network and ONE
Simulator to model node mobility. The analyzed QoS
parameters are packet delivery ratio (PDR), throughput,
and end-to-end delay. The results of the simulation show
that changing the number of nodes and node velocity
affects the performance in the network. On the number
of nodes scenario with attacks, the average value of PDR
decreases by 48.03%, throughput decreases by 50.23%,
and delay, for black hole, decreases by 80.18% but
increases by 47.87% for jellyfish. Whereas in the node
velocity scenario, the average values of PDR, throughput,
and delay decrease by 58.52%, 60.34%, 13.81% for black
hole attack, respectively. However, the delay increases by
123.91% for jellyfish attack.
Index Terms—Black hole attack, IDS, jellyfish attack,
and VANET
I. INTRODUCTION
VEHICULAR Ad Hoc Network (VANET) is an ad-hoc network that allows vehicles to communicate
with others without any fixed infrastructure. VANETs
is a promising approach to intelligent transportation
system (ITS) [1]. A network system that connects to
the Internet requires better protection in usage because
it has a high threat level [2]. Ad-hoc network has
a decentralized architecture and algorithm in ad-hoc
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network relies on the participation of cooperative node
on the network VANET. So any decision making is
decentralized, it can be used by attackers to perform
the attack. The attack aimed to destabilize a running
cooperative algorithm [3]. It makes VANET network
vulnerable to attacks that can cause problems even on
small networks. In addition, it can pose a threat to net-
work security that can worsen the function or network
services. Among all the existing challenges, network
security on VANET less noted for this. Data packets
in VANET contains information critical and needs to
be ensured that those packages are not accessed or
modified by attackers. Network security issue is not
similar to the communication network in general. The
size of the network, mobility, geographic relevance,
and other things to make this implementation difficult
and different from other network security [4].
Reference [5] studied that black hole attack reduces
packet delivery fraction to 10%–40%, but when there
are the addition algorithm IDS, up to 90%–98%. The
algorithm IDS have the advantage of not requiring
the addition of overhead and slight modification of
AODV. Reference [6] simulates jellyfish attack using
AODV routing protocol on a network of MANET. The
results of these simulations that the jellyfish affects
network performance with improving end-to-end delay
and jitter. Based on previous related research, can be
drawn the conclusion that the offensive black hole and
jelly fish can be solved by doing a modification on the
routing protocols that are used namely AODV. Because
some attacks carried out modifications to the RREP
message that interferes with the process of routing. So
counterfeited RREP message, which seems malicious
nodes have the latest and fastest routing.
In this research, to prevent the attacks, IDSAODV
is used as prevention algorithm for both attacks in
two scenarios. The vehicular environment is modeled
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in highway road, which took Jakarta-Cikampek Toll
Road.
This article is decomposed into five sections. Sec-
tion II presents the basic theory in this research.
Section III presents the model used in the current
research. Section IV discussed the simulation result
and analysis according to the data and theory. Finally,
Section V briefly restates the research problem and
summarizes the current finding
II. THEORY
A. Vehicular Ad-Hoc Network
VANET is wireless ad-hoc that allows communi-
cation between vehicles or vehicles with devices on
the roadside. With purpose, that enhances the security
of transportation. The movement of the vehicles or
node on VANET is very dynamic because the vehicle
moving at a high speed and the position changes con-
stantly. These characteristics make network topology
change rapidly, so the link between node connect and
disconnect very often [7].
The communication mode on VANET can be clas-
sified into two categories. Vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V)
communications mode is mode communication be-
tween the nodes on the vehicle or On-Board Unit
(OBU). Vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I) road is a mode
of communication between nodes or vehicles with
hardware on the roadside or Road Side Unit (RSU) [7].
B. Ad-Hoc on Demand Distance Vector
Ad-hoc On Demand Distance Vector (AODV) rout-
ing protocol is the reactive and on-demand routing
protocol. The routing table will only update when the
source and destination nodes need to transmit data
packets. AODV routing protocol operates in two stages,
namely, route discovery and route maintenance [5].
When the source node wants to communicate with the
destination node, but do not have the route, then the
source node will initialize the route discovery process.
AODV route discovery process uses control messages
to determine the route to the destination node. There
are three control messages of route discovery as below:
1) Route Request: Route Request (RREQ) will be
sent when the source node wants to send a packet to
the node that is not a node’s neighbors and who have
not establish the route. Source node will broadcast the
RREQ to all nodes, which is adjacent to the source
node. In Table I presents fields in RREP message. In
the RREQ message, there is a hop count field that states
the number of hops that must transmit by the RREQ. In
addition, there is broadcast ID and a sequence number
that serves to avoid the sending of the same message
to a node.
Fig. 1. Black hole attack mechanism.
2) Route Reply: When the nodes receive Route
Reply (RREP) packets, the nodes will look up to its
routing table whether it has a route to the destination
or not. If the node has a route to the destination or the
destination itself, it will send the RREP packets. When
the RREP packet arrived on the source node, then
the route will be established through the intermediate
nodes and path, assuming that it is the fastest route [8].
Table II is the fields inside RREP message.
C. Black Hole Attack
Black hole node sends false routing information,
claiming that the node has the fastest route. By manip-
ulates the RREP field, using highest sequence number
and hop count was set to 1, causing the intermediate
nodes send data packets to malicious nodes. After the
route is established to black hole node, it will drop all
the packets without forwarding the packet to the other
nodes [9].
D. Jellyfish Attack
Jellyfish attack can be classified into three subcate-
gories; jellyfish delay variance attack is applied in this
research. First, jellyfish node will manipulate the other
nodes to establish the route to itself by using false
RREP. In this research, it was applied by changing
highest sequence number field and hop count was set
to 1. After the route is established, jellyfish node adds
a delay on each packet before forwarding the packet,
without changing the sequence of the packet. Delay
can vary from 0 to 10 s randomly [6]. In this research,
delay varies from 0 to 2 s randomly before forwarding
the packet.
E. Intrusion Detection System
Intrusion Detection System (IDS) is a system for
detecting intrusion or interference on the network by
collecting, analyzing and auditing system of the data
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TABLE I
RREQ MESSAGE FIELD [8].
Source address Source sequence Broadcast id Destination address Destination sequence Hop count
TABLE II
RREQ MESSAGE FIELD [8].
Source address Destination address Destination sequence Hop count Lifetime
on the network. IDS monitor activities continuously,
as for example traffic package is passed.
IDSAODV assumes that the RREP message first
to come is RREP message from malicious nodes.
In route discovery process, the first RREP message
arrived is ignored and the second RREP arrives is
chosen to establish the routing path. This mechanism
is called RREP caching mechanism. In Network Sim-
ulator 2, four functions are added into idsaodv.cc,
which is rrep_insert to add the RREP mes-
sage, rrep_lookup to check whether there is an-
other RREP message, rrep_remove to remove all
the records from the other until the RREP message
from a particular node and rrep_purge to remove
the RREP periodically if it has expired. IDSAODV
will choose the second RREP arrived as the routing
path, whether it comes from malicious node again or
not [10].
III. RESEARCH METHOD
To prevent black hole and jellyfish attack, ID-
SAODV is applying to prevent or reduce the effects
of network performance. Inside IDSAODV, there are
RREP caching mechanism to reduce the effects of the
attack by ignoring the first RREP packet. Figure 2
shows RREP caching mechanism in IDSAODV. First,
the node will wait for the first arrived RREP packet. If
the first RREP packet arrived, IDSAODV will ignore
it and wait for the next RREP packet. The node will
establish routing patch through the node that sends the
next RREP packet.
This RREP caching mechanism assumes that the
first RREP packet comes from the black hole or
jellyfish node which contains false RREP. In the black
hole and jellyfish attack, the malicious node will send
false RREP that contains the highest sequence number
and hop count was set to one that will manipulate the
other nodes to establish routing patch to itself. With
IDSAODV, the first RREP packet is ignored and it
will reduce chances to establish the routing path to
the malicious node.
Mobility route in this research took Jakarta–
Cikampek toll road from KM 47–54. The parameter
of this simulation can be seen in Table III.
Fig. 2. Flowchart of RREP caching mechanism in IDSAODV.
TABLE III
SIMULATION PARAMETERS
Parameter Detail
Simulation Dimension 8000 × 1000
Simulasi Duration 400 seconds
Node Density 10 to 100 nodes
Node Velocity 70, 80, 90, 100, 110, 120 km/h
Routing Protocol AODV, idsAODV
Malicious Node Single Blackhole or Single Jellyfish
Mobility Model Map Based Movement
Traffic Direction Two ways
MAC MAC 802 11 Ext (IEEE 802.11p)
PHY Wireless 802 11 Ext (IEEE 802.11p)
Propagation Wave Model Two Ray Ground
Antenna Type Omnidirectional
Transport Layer UDP
Traffic Model CBR
This simulation consist of two scenarios, node den-
sity that varies from 10 to 100 nodes and node velocity
that varies from 70 to 120 km/h. The number of nodes
was generated by modifying number nodes configu-
ration of .tcl file inside Network Simulator 2. Each
node models a vehicle. For the node velocity scenario,
the vehicle speed is modeled using ONE Simulator
by setting the minimum and maximum speed of each
node. Each node is moving based on the mobility route.
Each simulation scenario for each configuration consist
of five conditions, normal, under black hole attack,
under black hole attack with IDS, under jelly fish attack
and under jellyfish attack with IDS.
Traffic is modeled as constant bit rate with UDP as
transport layer protocol. Total average packet sent was
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the first arrived RREP packet. If the first RREP packet 
arrived, IDSAODV will ignore it and wait for the next 
RREP packet. The node will establish routing patch 
through the node that sends the next RREP packet. 
This RREP caching mechanism assumes that the first 
RREP packet comes from the black hole or jellyfish node 
which contains false RREP. In the black hole and jellyfish 
attack, the malicious node will send false RREP that 
contains the highest sequence number and hop count was 
set to 1 that will manipulate the other nodes to establish 
routing patch to itself. With IDSAODV, the first RREP 
packet is ignored and it will reduce chances to establish 
the routing path to the malicious node. 
Mobility route in this research took Jakarta – Cikampek 
toll road from KM 47 – 54. The parameter of this 
simulation can be seen in Table I. This simulation consist 
of two scenarios, node density that varies from 10 to 100 
nodes and node velocity that varies from 70 to 120 km/h.  
 
TABLE I 
SIMULATION PARAMETERS 
 
 
 
 
 IV. SIMULATION RESULT AND ANALYSIS 
 
I. Node Density Scenario 
In this scenario, the changes to the number of nodes 
that are used i.e. 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70, 80, 90 and 
100 nodes at 70 km/h. These scenarios were simulated 
in normal condition, under black hole and jellyfish 
attack and the addition of IDS algorithm.  
In Fig. 5 shows that the PDR value has some 
fluctuations but it tends to decrease. Increasing 
number of nodes causing changes of network 
topology. Therefore, the routing path is changing for 
every amount of nodes. 
 Meanwhile, the average value of PDR under black 
hole attack decrease by 76.13% from the normal 
condition and under jellyfish attack decrease by 
19.94% from the normal condition. The black hole 
attack dropping the entire packet in the network, while 
jellyfish attack still forwarding the packet. Graph of 
the PDR value under jellyfish attack always greater 
than black hole attack, because IDS algorithm will 
ignore the first RREP packet and use the second RREP 
packet arrived to establish the route. For black hole 
attack with IDS, the PDR value increase by 53.34% 
and for jellyfish attack with IDS increase by 6.99%. 
In Fig. 6 shows that the throughput value increase 
along with changes the number of nodes in all 
conditions. This is due to increase of the number of 
nodes, the more packets that are sent and received, the 
traffic in the network keeps increasing. Increasing the 
number of nodes also takes the process of route 
discovery longer than AODV condition. Where each 
node will be looking for the best routing with sends an 
RREQ message to its neighbor nodes and the 
destination nodes will send RREP message in return 
and unicast. Therefore, the more the number of nodes 
in the network, then the greater the throughput values 
on the network. Black hole and jellyfish attack 
decrease the throughput value in the network. Under 
Parameter Detail 
Simulation Dimension 8000 x 1000 
Simulasi Duration 400 second 
Node Density 10 to 100 nodes 
Node Velocity 70, 80, 90, 100, 110, 120 km/h 
Routing Protocol AODV, idsAODV 
Malicious Node Single Blackhole or Single Jellyfish 
Mobility Model Map Based Movement 
Traffic Direction  Two ways 
MAC MAC 802_11 Ext (IEEE 802.11p) 
PHY Wireless 802_11 Ext (IEEE 802.11p) 
Propagation Wave Model Two Ray Ground 
Antenna Type Omnidirectional 
Transport Layer UDP 
Traffic Model CBR 
0
20
40
60
80
100
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
P
D
R
 (
%
)
Number of nodes (node)
PDR
AODV AODV-BH AODV-BH-IDS
AODV-JF AODV-JF-IDS
0
100
200
300
400
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
T
h
ro
u
g
h
p
u
t 
(K
b
p
s)
Number of nodes (node)
Throughput
AODV AODV-BH AODV-BH-IDS
AODV-JF AODV-JF-IDS
Fig. 6 Throughput Graph for First Scenario 
Fig. 3. Packet delivery ratio graph for node density scenario.
31011 and total packet received was 29150 for normal
condition based on 30 times generated traffic.
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
A. Node Density Scenario
In this scenario, the changes to the number of nodes
that are used, i.e., 10, 20, . . ., 100 nodes at 70 km/h.
These scenarios were simulated in normal condition,
under black hole and jellyfish attack and the addition
of IDS algorithm.
In Fig. 3 shows that the PDR value has some fluc-
tuations but it tends to decrease. Increasing number of
nodes causing changes of network topology. Therefore,
the routing path is changing for every amount of
nodes. AODV shows the graph for normal condition,
AODV-BH shows the graph for black attack condition,
AODV-BH-IDS shows the graph for black hole attack
condition with IDS, AODV-JF shows the graph for jelly
fish attack and AODV-JF-IDS shows the graph for jelly
fish attack with IDS.
Meanwhile, the average value of PDR under black
hole attack decrease by 76.13% from the normal con-
dition and under jellyfish attack decrease by 19.94%
from the normal condition. The black hole attack drop-
ping the entire packet in the network, while jellyfish
attack still forwarding the packet. Graph of the PDR
value under jellyfish attack always greater than black
hole attack, because IDS algorithm will ignore the first
RREP packet and use the second RREP packet arrived
to establish the route. For black hole attack with IDS,
the PDR value increase by 53.34% and for jellyfish
attack with IDS increase by 6.99%.
In Fig. 4 shows that the throughput value increase
along with changes the number of nodes in all con-
ditions. This is due to increase of the number of
nodes, the more packets that are sent and received,
the traffic in the network keeps increasing. Increasing
the number of nodes also takes the process of route
discovery longer than AODV condition. Each node
the first arrived RREP packet. If the first RREP packe  
arrived, IDSAODV will ignore it and wait for the next 
RREP packet. The node will establish routing patch 
through the node that sends the next RREP packet. 
This RREP caching mechanism assumes that the first 
RREP packet comes from the black hole or jellyfish node 
which contains false RREP. In the black hole and jellyfish 
attack, the malicious node will send false RREP that 
contains the highest sequence number and hop count was 
set to 1 that will manipulate the other nodes to establish 
routing patch to itself. With IDSAODV, the first RREP 
packet is ignored and it will reduce chances to establish 
the routing path to the malicious node. 
Mobility route in this research took Jakarta – Cikampek 
toll road from KM 47 – 54. The parameter of this 
simulation can be seen in Table I. This simulation consist 
of two scenarios, node density that varies from 10 to 100 
nodes and node velocity that varies from 70 to 120 km/h.  
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I. Node Density Scenario 
In this scenario, the changes to the number of nodes 
that are used i.e. 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70, 80, 90 and 
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in norm l condition, under black hole and jellyfish 
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 Meanwhile, the average value of PDR under black 
hole attack decrease by 76.13% from the normal 
condition and under jellyfish attack decrease by 
19.94% from the normal condition. The black hole 
attack dropping the entire packet in the network, while 
jellyfish attack still forwarding the packet. Graph of 
the PDR value under jellyfish attack always greater 
than black hole attack, because IDS algorithm will 
ignore the first RREP packet and use the second RREP 
packet arrived to establish the route. For black hole 
attack with IDS, the PDR value increase by 53.34% 
and for jellyfish attack with IDS increase by 6.99%. 
In Fig. 6 shows that the throug p t value increase 
along with changes the number of nodes in all 
conditions. This is due to increase of the number of 
nodes, the more packets that are sent and received, the 
traffic in the network keeps increasing. Increasing the 
nu ber of nodes also takes the process of route 
discovery longer than AODV condition. Where each 
node will be looking for the best routing with sends an 
RREQ message to its neighbor nodes and the 
destination nodes will send RREP message in return 
and unicast. Therefore, the more the number of nodes 
in the network, then the greater the throughput values 
on the network. Black hole and jellyfish attack 
decrease the throughput value in the network. Under 
Parameter Detail 
Simulation Dimension 8000 x 1000 
Simulasi Duration 400 second 
Node Density 10 to 100 nodes 
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Routing Protocol AODV, idsAODV 
Malicious Node Single Blackhole or Single Jellyfish 
Mobility Model Map Based Movement 
Traffic Direction  Two ways 
MAC MAC 802_11 Ext (IEEE 802.11p) 
PHY Wireless 802_11 Ext (IEEE 802.11p) 
Propagation Wave Model Two Ray Ground 
Antenna Type Omnidirectional 
Transport Layer UDP 
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Fig. 4. Throughput graph for node density scenario.
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black hole attack, the average throughput value decreased 
drastically by 80.18% or 146.66 Kbps from the normal 
condition. While under jellyfish attack, the throughput 
value decreased by 24.28% or 44.42 Kbps from the 
normal condition. In other words, black hole attack affects 
more on throughput parameters compared to jellyfish 
attack. This is because, the black hole node sends a false 
RREP message in reply to RREQ sender node, aiming to 
manipulate the routing path so that the malicious node 
seems to have the latest routing updates by replacing the 
sequence number into highest sequence number or 
4294967295 and the nearest route by replacing the hop 
count to 1. That way, the process of route discovery took 
faster than normal condition. In other words, exchange 
routing message is less than the normal condition and the 
throughput decreased. 
In Fig. 7 shows that the average end-to-end delay 
value changes in the addition number of nodes. The end-
to-end delay value has some fluctuations but it tends to 
decrease along with addition number of nodes. This 
fluctuation due to several factors, namely, traffic data, 
network topology, and the position of each node. Those 
things result in fluctuations of the simulations due to 
routing path that varies each amou t of nodes. Under 
black hole attack, the avera e delay is decreased by 
50.12% or 98.76 ms compared to norm l conditions. This 
is due to under black hole attack, route discovery process 
lasts faster than normal condition. So that the nodes do 
not need to wait for RREP because the nearest black hole 
would immediately send a false RREP message. The 
purpose of it to manipulate the other nodes to establish the 
routing path to a malicious node, and dropping all the 
packets. Therefore, the route discovery process becomes 
shorter than normal condition. Whereas the normal 
condition carried out the process of discovery route in 
accordance with the mechanism of AODV routing 
protocol. In other words, the nodes will continue to do the 
broadcast RREQ to get reply message with the nearest 
routing RREP, which indicates that the node's 
neighbors destination node. Therefore, the average 
value of end-to-end delay on conditions without any 
attack greater than the conditions in the black hole [11] 
[12]. 
Jellyfish attack highly affects the value of end-to-
end delay on the network. The value of end-to-end 
delay under jelly fish attack is 47.87% greater 
compared to normal conditions. This is due to this type 
of attack, which is jellyfish delay variance attack. 
Where the malicious node will forward the data 
package after delaying few seconds randomly on each 
packet within 0 to 2 seconds in this research. The 
value of end-to-end delay under jellyfish attack is 
higher than other conditions. In other words, jellyfish 
attack affects more than black hole attack. 
The addition of IDS algorithm can reduce end-to-
end delay in the offensive black hole and jellyfish 
attack. Under black hole attack, the average value of 
end-to-end delay is likely to decrease by 16.67%, 
although a number of nodes value is greater than under 
black hole attack. While the jellyfish attack, the 
average value of end-to-end delay is decreased by 
11.50% compared to under jellyfish attack. The 
decrease in the value of end-to-end delay is due to 
both attacks sends the false RREP message that aims 
to take over routing patch to the malicious node itself. 
So the data packets will be sent to the malicious node 
and the attack took place. With added the IDS 
algorithm, then the malicious node will perform 
additional RREP caching mechanism to the routing 
process to avoid malicious nodes in the network, so 
the data packets are not forwarding through or stop at 
the malicious node.  
 
II. Node Velocity Scenario 
In this second scenario, the analysis is carried out 
based on the change of velocity of the node in several 
conditions. As for the change of velocity varies from 
70, 80, 90, 100, 110 and 120 km/h. With the same 
number of nodes i.e. 100 nodes in all conditions and 
parameters. While the performance parameters based 
on QoS parameters, which is Packet Delivery Ratio, 
and Throughput and End-to-end delay. 
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Fig. 5. End-to-end delay graph for node density scenario.
will look for the best routing with sends an RREQ
message to its neighbor nodes and the destination
nodes will send RREP message in return and uni-
cast. Therefore, the more the number of nodes in the
network, then the gr ater the throughput values on
the network. Black hole and jellyfish attack decrease
the throughput value in the network. Under black
hole attack, the average throughput value decreased
drastically by 80.18% or 146.66 Kbps from the normal
condition. While under jellyfish attack, the throughput
value decreased by 24.28% or 44.42 Kbps from the
normal condition. In other words, black hole attack
affects more on throughput parameters compared to
jellyfish attack. This is because, the black hole node
sends a false RREP message in reply to RREQ sender
node, aiming to manipulate the routing path so that
the malicious node seems to have the latest routing
updates by replacing the sequence number into highest
sequence number or 4294967295 and the nearest route
by replacing the hop count to 1. That way, the process
of route discovery took faster than normal condition.
In other words, exchange routing message is less than
the normal condition and the throughput decreased.
In Fig. 5 shows that the average end-to-end delay
value changes in the addition number of nodes. The
end-to-end delay value has some fluctuations but it
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tends to decrease along with addition number of nodes.
This fluctuation due to several factors, namely, traffic
data, network topology, and the position of each node.
Those things result in fluctuations of the simulations
due to routing path that varies each amount of nodes.
Under black hole attack, the average delay is decreased
by 50.12% or 98.76 ms compared to normal conditions.
This is due to under black hole attack, route discovery
process lasts faster than normal condition. So that the
nodes do not need to wait for RREP because the
nearest black hole would immediately send a false
RREP message. The purpose of it to manipulate the
other nodes to establish the routing path to a malicious
node, and dropping all the packets. Therefore, the
route discovery process becomes shorter than normal
condition. Whereas the normal condition carried out
the process of discovery route in accordance with the
mechanism of AODV routing protocol. In other words,
the nodes will continue to do the broadcast RREQ
to get reply message with the nearest routing RREP,
which indicates that the node’s neighbors destination
node. Therefore, the average value of end-to-end delay
on conditions without any attack greater than the
conditions in the black hole [11, 12].
Jellyfish attack highly affects the value of end-to-end
delay on the network. The value of end-to-end delay
under jelly fish attack is 47.87% greater compared to
normal conditions. This is due to this type of attack,
which is jellyfish delay variance attack. Where the
malicious node will forward the data package after
delaying few seconds randomly on each packet within
0 to 2 seconds in this research. The value of end-to-
end delay under jellyfish attack is higher than other
conditions. In other words, jellyfish attack affects more
than black hole attack.
The addition of IDS algorithm can reduce end-to-end
delay in the offensive black hole and jellyfish attack.
Under black hole attack, the average value of end-to-
end delay is likely to decrease by 16.67%, although a
number of nodes value is greater than under black hole
attack. While the jellyfish attack, the average value of
end-to-end delay is decreased by 11.50% compared
to under jellyfish attack. The decrease in the value
of end-to-end delay is due to both attacks sends the
false RREP message that aims to take over routing
patch to the malicious node itself. So the data packets
will be sent to the malicious node and the attack
took place. With added the IDS algorithm, then the
malicious node will perform additional RREP caching
mechanism to the routing process to avoid malicious
nodes in the network, so the data packets are not
forwarding through or stop at the malicious node.
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black hole attack, the average throughput value decreased 
drastically by 80.18% or 146.66 Kbps from the normal 
condition. While under jellyfish attack, the throughput 
value decreased by 24.28% or 44.42 Kbps from the 
normal condition. In other words, black hole attack affects 
more on throughput parameters compared to jellyfish 
attack. This is because, the black hole node sends a false 
RREP message in reply to RREQ sender node, aiming to 
manipulate the routing path so that the malicious node 
seems to have the latest routing updates by replacing the 
sequence number into highest sequence number or 
4294967295 and the nearest route by replacing the hop 
count to 1. That way, the process of route discovery took 
faster than normal condition. In other words, exchange 
routing message is less than the normal condition and the 
throughput decreased. 
In Fig. 7 shows that the average end-to-end delay 
value changes in the addition number of nodes. The end-
to-end delay value has some fluctuations but it tends to 
decrease along with addition number of nodes. This 
fluctuation due to several factors, namely, traffic data, 
network topology, and the position of each node. Those 
things result in fluctuations of the simulations due to 
routing path that varies each amount of nodes. Under 
black hole attack, the average delay is decreased by 
50.12% or 98.76 ms compared to normal conditions. This 
is due to under black hole attack, route discovery process 
lasts faster than normal condition. So that the nodes do 
not need to wait for RREP because the nearest black hole 
would immediately send a false RREP message. The 
purpose of it to manipulate the other nodes to establish the 
routing path to a malicious node, and dropping all the 
packets. Therefore, the route discovery process becomes 
shorter than normal condition. Whereas the normal 
condition carried out the process of discovery route in 
accordance with the mechanism of AODV routing 
protocol. In other words, the nodes will continue to do the 
broadcast RREQ to get reply message with the nearest 
routing RREP, which indicates that the node's 
neighbors destination node. Therefore, the average 
value of end-to-end delay on conditions without any 
attack greater than the conditions in the black hole [11] 
[12]. 
Jellyfish attack highly affects the value of end-to-
end delay on the network. The value of end-to-end 
delay under jelly fish attack is 47.87% greater 
compared to normal conditions. This is due to this type 
of attack, which is jellyfish delay variance attack. 
Where the malicious node will forward the data 
package after delaying few seconds randomly on each 
packet within 0 to 2 seconds in this research. The 
value of end-to-end delay under jellyfish attack is 
higher than other conditions. In other words, jellyfish 
attack affects more than black hole attack. 
The addition of IDS algorithm can reduce end-to-
end delay in the offensive black hole and jellyfish 
attack. Under black hole attack, the average value of 
end-to-end delay is likely to decrease by 16.67%, 
although a number of nodes value is greater than under 
black hole attack. While the jellyfish attack, the 
average value of end-to-end delay is decreased by 
11.50% compared to under jellyfish attack. The 
decrease in the value of end-to-end delay is due to 
both attacks sends the false RREP message that aims 
to take over routing patch to the malicious node itself. 
So the data packets will be sent to the malicious node 
and the attack took place. With added the IDS 
algorithm, then the malicious node will perform 
additional RREP caching mechanism to the routing 
process to avoid malicious nodes in the network, so 
the data packets are not forwarding through or stop at 
the malicious node.  
 
II. Node Velocity Scenario 
In this second scenario, the analysis is carried out 
based on the change of velocity of the node in several 
conditions. As for the change of velocity varies from 
70, 80, 90, 100, 110 a d 120 km/h. With the same 
number of nodes i.e. 100 nodes in all conditions and 
parameters. While the performance parameters based 
on QoS parameters, which is Packet Delivery Ratio, 
and Throughput and End-to-end delay. 
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Fig. 7 End-to-end Delay Graph for First Scenario 
Fig. 8 PDR Graph for Second Scenario Fig. 6. Packet delivery ratio graph for node velocity scenario.
B. Node Velocity Scenario
In this second scenario, the analysis is carried out
based on the change of velocity of the node in several
conditions. As for the change of velocity varies from
70, 80, 90, 100, 110, and 120 km/h. With the same
number of nodes, i.e., 100 nodes in all conditions and
parameters. While the performance parameters based
on QoS parameters, which is Packet Delivery Ratio,
and Throughput and End-to-end delay.
In Fig. 6 shows that the value of PDR from all
condition has decreased along with the addition of
node velocity. Normal conditions have the highest PDR
value compared to the other conditions. However, the
value of PDR on normal conditions has decreased
slightly along with the addition of node velocity. This
is due to the faster moving nodes in the network then
the possibility of termination of communication links
between nodes is getting bigger, so the value of PDR
decreasing.
In addition, the average PDR value under black hole
attack decrease by 84.53% from the normal condition.
While in jellyfish attack, the PDR value decrease by
32.5% from normal conditions. With the node velocity
scenario, then the termination of node link communi-
cation is faster and often occurs so that the packages
have not had transmitted the data packets but the link
has been disconnected beforehand.
On the conditions of the addition algorithm IDS as
a response to the attacks of black hole and jellyfish.
For the black hole attack with the addition of IDS
algorithm, the average PDR value of PDR increases
by 83.69% from under black hole attack condition. For
jellyfish attack with IDS. The PDR value increase by
16.3% from under attack. The increase in PDR value
is due to the RREP caching mechanism in IDS, first
RREP message ignored and passed through the next
RREP message arrived.
In Fig. 7 shows the throughput value of all condi-
tions tends to decrease along with the addition of node
81
In 
Pr
es
s
Cite this article as: “Network Security Analysis in Vanet Against Black Hole and Jelly Fish Attack with
Intrusion Detection System Algorithm”, CommIT (Communication & Information Technology) Journal 11(2),
77–83, 2017.
0
100
200
300
70 80 90 100 110 120
T
h
ro
u
g
h
p
u
t 
(K
b
p
s)
Node velocity (km/h)
Throughput
AODV AODV-BH AODV-BH-IDS
AODV-JF AODV-JF-IDS
0
100
200
300
70 80 90 100 110 120
E
n
d
-t
o
-e
n
d
 D
e
la
y
 (
m
s)
Node velocity (km/h)
End-to-end Delay
AODV AODV-BH AODV-BH-IDS
AODV-JF AODV-JF-IDS
In Fig. 8 shows that the value of PDR from all 
condition has decreased along with the addition of node 
velocity. Normal conditions have the highest PDR value 
compared to the other conditions. However, the value of 
PDR on normal conditions has decreased slightly along 
with the addition of node velocity. This is due to the faster 
moving nodes in the network then the possibility of 
termination of communication links between nodes is 
getting bigger, so the value of PDR decreasing.  
In addition, the average PDR value under black hole 
attack decrease by 84.53% from the normal condition. 
While in jellyfish attack, the PDR value decrease by 
32.5% from normal conditions. With the node velocity 
scenario, then the termination of node link 
communication is faster and often occurs so that the 
packages have not had transmitted the data packets but 
the link has been disconnected beforehand. 
On the conditions of the addition algorithm IDS as a 
response to the attacks of black hole and jellyfish. For the 
black hole attack with the addition of IDS algorithm, the 
average PDR value of PDR increases by 83.69% from 
under black hole attack condition. For jellyfish attack 
with IDS. The PDR value increase by 16.3 % from under 
attack. The increase in PDR value is due to the RREP 
caching mechanism in IDS, first RREP message ignored 
and passed through the next RREP message arrived.   
In Fig. 9 shows the throughput value of all conditions 
tends to decrease along with the addition of node velocity. 
This happens due to the increasing speed of movement of 
a node, the termination of the communication link will be 
more frequent and the process of route discovery becomes 
disturbed. It can cause a decrease in the throughput value 
of the network. Black hole attack decreases the 
throughput value by 84.98% from normal conditions. 
While in jellyfish attack, the throughput value decrease by 
35.71%. In other words, the black hole attack affects more 
than jellyfish attack. This is because the black hole attack 
did dropping packet, while in jellyfish attack still 
forwarding the packet. 
On the addition of IDS algorithm, can be seen that the 
throughput value increase by 80.79% of from normal 
condition. While in jellyfish attack, the throughput value 
increase by 16.97% from the normal condition. With the 
addition of IDS algorithm results in increasing the 
throughput value for both attack. Because the algorithm 
IDS will ignore the first RREP message assuming that 
it comes from the malicious node and uses the next 
RREP message arrived as a routing path. 
In Fig. 10 shows that the end-to-end delay graph 
for all conditions. Overall, the average value of end-to-
end delay in all conditions of has decreased along with 
the increase of velocity. This is because with 
increasing speed of nodes, then the greater the 
possibility of disconnection of communication links 
between nodes. Under normal conditions, it would 
result in nodes has to be looking for the latest 
continuous routing due to network topology change 
rapidly. Therefore, end-to-end delay value keeps 
increasing along with the addition of node velocity. 
Under black hole attack, the end-to-end delay value 
has some fluctuations. At speed of 90km/h, the end-to-
end delay value increases, but at speed of 100 and 110 
km/h it decreases. Overall, the end-to-end delay value 
is decreased by 13.81% from normal condition, but at 
speed of 120 km/h, it increases by 14.85% from 
normal conditions. The black hole node performs the 
modification process that causes the RREP route 
discovery to take place faster so that the value of end-
to-end delay is much smaller than the normal 
condition. As the node speed increase of the speed, the 
communication link termination occurs more frequent, 
so that at a speed of 120 km/h, the value of end-to-end 
delay is higher than normal conditions. 
Under jellyfish attack, the end-to-end delay value 
increases by 123.19% from the normal condition and 
has some fluctuations at speed of 80 and 90 km/h, but 
tends to increase along with the increasing speed of the 
node. This is due to jellyfish node wait 0 to 2 seconds 
before forwarding packet to other nodes, so the end-to-
end delay value will be higher than normal condition. 
On the conditions of the addition algorithm IDS 
addition, the value of end-to-end delay has decreased 
for both attacks. The addition algorithm IDS on black 
hole attack can decrease the end-to-end delay value by 
30.69% from black hole condition. Although the value 
of end-to-end delay on the addition algorithm still has 
fluctuations along with the addition of the node speed 
but tends to increase along with the increasing speed 
of node. For the jellyfish attack and IDS algorithm, the 
end-to-end delay value decrease by 24.18% from 
Fig. 9 Throughput Graph for Second Scenario 
Fig. 10 End-to-end Delay Graph for Second Scenario 
Fig. 7. Throughput graph for node velocity scenario.
velocity. This happens due to the increasing speed of
movement of a node, the termi ation of the commu-
nication link will be more frequent and the process
of route discovery becomes disturbed. It can caus a
decrease in the t roughput value of the network. Black
hole attack decreases the throughput value by 84.98%
from n rmal conditions. While in jellyfish attack, the
throughput value decrease by 35.71%. In other words,
the black hole attack affects more than jellyfish attack.
This is because the black h le attack did dropping
packet, while in jellyfish attack still forwarding the
packet.
On the addition of IDS algorithm, can be seen that
the throughput value increase by 80.79% of from nor-
mal condition. While in jellyfish attack, the throughput
value increase by 16.97% from the normal condition.
With the addition of IDS algorithm results in increasing
the throughput value for both attack. Because the
algorithm IDS will ignore the first RREP message
assuming that it comes from the malicious node and
uses the next RREP message arrived as a routing path.
In Fig. 8 shows that the end-to-end delay graph for
all conditions. Overall, the average value of end-to-end
delay in all conditions of has decreased along with the
increase of velocity. This is because with increasing
speed of nodes, then the greater the possibility of
disconnection of communication links between nodes.
Under normal conditions, it would result in nodes has
to be looking for the latest continuous routing due
to network topology change rapidly. Therefore, end-
to-end delay value keeps increasing along with the
addition of node velocity.
Under black hole attack, the end-to-end delay value
has some fluctuations. At speed of 90 km/h, the end-to-
end delay value increases, but at speed of 100 km/h and
110 km/h it decreases. Overall, the end-to-end delay
value is decreased by 13.81% from normal condition,
but at speed of 120 km/h, it increases by 14.85%
from normal conditions. The black hole node performs
the modification process that causes the RREP route
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In Fig. 8 shows that the value of PDR from all 
condition has decreased along with the addition of node 
velocity. Normal conditions have the highest PDR valu  
compared t  the other conditions. Howeve , the value f 
PDR on normal conditions has decreased slightly along 
with the addition of node velocity. This is due to the fast r 
moving nodes in the network then the possib lity f 
termination of communication links between odes is 
getting bigger, so the value of PDR decreasing.  
In addition, the average PDR value under black ho e 
attack decrease by 84.53% from the normal con ition. 
While in jellyfish attack, the PDR value r se by 
32.5% from normal conditions. With the node velocity
scenario, then the termination of node link 
communication is faster and often occurs so that the 
packages have not had transmitted the data packets but 
the link has been disconnected beforehand. 
On the conditions of the addition algorithm IDS as a 
response to the attacks of black hole and jellyfish. For he 
black hole attack with the addition of IDS algorithm, the 
average PDR value of PDR increases by 83.69% from 
under black hole attack condition. For jellyfish attack 
with IDS. The PDR value increase by 16.3 % from under 
attack. The increase in PDR value is due t  the RREP 
caching mechanism in IDS, first RREP message ig o d 
and passed through the next RREP message arrived.   
I  Fig. 9 shows he throughput val e of all conditions 
tends to decrease along with the addition of node velocity. 
This happens due to the increasing speed of movement of 
a node, the termination of the communication link will be 
more frequent and the process of route discovery becomes 
disturbed. It can cause a decrease in the throughput value 
of the network. Black hole attack decreases the 
throughput value by 84.98% from normal conditions. 
While in jellyfish attack, the throughput value decrease by 
35.71%. In other words, the black hole attack affects more 
than jellyfish attack. This is because the black hole attack 
did dropping packet, while in jellyfish attack still 
forwarding the packet. 
On the addition of IDS algorithm, can be seen that the 
throughput value increase by 80.79% of from normal 
condition. While in jellyfish attack, the throughput value 
increase by 16.97% from the normal condition. With the 
additio  of IDS algorithm results in increasing the 
throughput value for both attack. Because the algorithm 
IDS will ignore the first RREP message assuming that 
it comes from the alicious ode and uses the next 
RREP message arrived as a routing path. 
In Fig. 10 shows that the end-to-end delay graph 
for all conditions. Overall, the average value of end-to-
end delay in all conditions of has decreased along with 
the increase of velocity. This is because with 
increasing speed of nodes, then the greater the 
possibility of disconnection of communication links 
between nodes. Under normal conditions, it would 
result in nodes has to be looking for the latest 
continuous routing due to network topology change 
rapidly. Therefore, end-to-end delay value keeps 
increasing along with the addition of node velocity. 
Under black hole attack, the end-to-end delay value 
has some fluctuations. At speed of 90km/h, the end-to-
end delay value increases, but at speed of 100 and 110 
km/h it decreases. Overall, the end-to-end delay value 
is decreased by 13.81% from normal condition, but at 
speed of 120 km/h, it increases by 14.85% from 
normal conditions. The black hole node performs the 
modification process that causes the RREP route 
discovery to take place faster so that the value of end-
to-end delay is much smaller than the normal 
condition. As the node speed increase of the speed, the 
communication link termination occurs more frequent, 
so that at a speed of 120 km/h, the value of end-to-end 
delay is higher than normal conditions. 
Under jellyfish attack, the end-to-end delay value 
increases by 123.19% from the normal condition and 
has some fluctuations at speed of 80 and 90 km/h, but 
tends to increase along with the increasing speed of the 
node. This is due to jellyfish node wait 0 to 2 seconds 
before forwarding packet to other nodes, so the end-to-
end delay value will be higher than normal condition. 
On the conditions of the addition algorithm IDS 
addition, the value of end-to-end delay has decreased 
for both attacks. The addition algorithm IDS on black 
hole attack can decrease the end-to-end delay value by 
30.69% from black hole condition. Although the value 
of end-to-end delay on the addition algorithm still has 
fluctuations along with the addition of the node speed 
but tends to increase along with the increasing speed 
of node. For the jellyfish attack and IDS algorithm, the 
end-to-end delay value decrease by 24.18% from 
Fig. 9 Throughput Graph for Second Scenario 
Fig. 10 End-to-end Delay Graph for Second Scenario 
Fig. 8. End-to-end delay graph for the second scenario.
discovery to take pl ce faster so that the value of
end-to-end delay is much smaller than the normal
con tion. As the node speed i crease of the speed, the
communication link termination occurs more frequent,
so that at a speed of 120 km/h, the value of end-to-end
delay is higher than normal co itions.
Under jellyfish attack, the end-to-end delay value
increases by 123.19% f o the normal condition and
has some fluctuations at speed f 80 km/h and 90 km/h,
but tends to increase along with the increasing speed
of the n e. This is due to jellyfis node wait 0 to 2 s
before forwarding packet to other nodes, so the end-to-
end delay value will be higher than normal condition.
On the conditions of the addition algorithm IDS
addition, the value of end-to-end delay has decreased
for both attacks. The addition alg rithm IDS on black
hole attack can decrease the end-to-end delay value by
30.69% from black hole condition. Although the value
of end-to-end delay on the addition algorithm still has
fluctuations along with the addition of the node speed
but tends to increase al ng with the increasing speed
of node. For the jellyfish attack and IDS algorithm, the
end-to-end delay valu decrease by 24.18% from under
a tack. This happens because in the addition of the IDS
there is an RREP caching mechanism that assuming the
first RREP packet arrive comes from malicious nodes.
So that the routing path will establish using the next
RREP packet arrives.
V. CONCLUSION
The addition of IDS algorithm can increase the per-
formance of the network based on the QoS parameters,
namely the PDR, throughput, and end-to-end delay
compared with conditions under attack. The average
values of PDR on the black hole attack increase by
53.34% in Scenario 1 and 83.69% in Scenario 2. For
jellyfish attack, the average values of PDR increase of
6.99% in Scenario 1 and 16.3% in Scenario 2. The av-
erage value of throughput on black hole attack increase
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by 61.24% or 22.20 kbps on Scenario 1 and 80.79%
or 3.1833 kbps on Scenario 2. For jellyfish attack,
average throughput increase by 7.96% or 11.02 kbps
on scenario 1 and 16.97% or 28.92 kbps on scenario-2.
The average value of end-to-end delay under black hole
attack decrease by 6.53% or 6.41 ms on Scenario 1
and 30.69% or 25.69 ms in the 2nd scenario. For
jellyfish attack, the average value of end-to-end delay
is decreased by 11.5% or 33.51 ms on Scenario 1 and
24.18% or 52.40 kbps for Scenario 2.
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